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  1. Introduction 
 
As the 2001 World Bank report says, a very decisive point for the 
sustainable economic growth in a country is whether the financial system 
operates well or not. A well-operating financial system can contribute to the 
national wealth. One way to develop an effective financial system with 
enough competitive advantages is through attracting foreign banks’ entry. 
(See among others, IMF1 2000 and Claessens and Jansen, 2000).  
 
Tschoegl (1985) has documented that, foreign banks’ entries began as 
early as in 1920. At that period of time, several foreign banks were allowed 
to enter only a few developed countries. In the last few decades of the 20th 
century, the economy became more and more globalized. Therefore, a 
trend towards worldwide financial integration appeared. More and more 
foreign banks have entered the developing countries.  
 
According to incomplete statistics, in 2002, foreign banks held up to 
33% of the overall shares of assets in banking segment in 104 developing 
countries, which represents an increase of 15% relative to the number in 
1995. And most of these assets were mainly from three regions of the 
developing world. They are Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin 
America and Sub-Saharen Africa. In Contrast, in East Asia & Pacific, 
Middle East & North Africa, and South Asia, foreign banks did not do a 
good job from 1995 to 2002. They held only about 10% of the overall assets 
in the banking segment and this number stayed unchanged all over the 
seven years (Micco, Panizza, and Yanez, 2006).  
 
1 International Monetary Fund. 
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The empirical studies show that, by October, 2003, foreign banks 
based in developed countries provided a total of 1.45 trillion U.S. dollars of 
credit to developing countries. Their lending behavior can be classified into 
three categories, namely cross-border lending, domestic lending in foreign 
currency and domestic lending in domestic currency. The first two types of 
lending accounted for 60% of the overall lending and were therefore 
regarded as the main credit service of foreign banks. The third type of 
lending was mainly conducted by local branches and subsidiaries of foreign 
banks and accounted for only 40% of the overall lending.  
        
China entered WTO on November 10th,, 2001 and at the same time 
announced that, in the following two years the foreign banks would be 
allowed to do Renminbi 2  business and in five years the Chinese 
government would remove all the regional restrictions towards foreign 
banks. Accordingly, foreign banks would be allowed to do transactions with 
any Chinese customers. In 2001, in Tianjin alone, the foreign banks had 
made a profit of 17.86 million U.S. dollars. In 2003, the average ROA of 
HSBC3 in China had risen to 1.01%, which was only 0.02% lower than the 
world average ROA. All of these profits were made in the presence of 
China’s relatively restrictive regulation towards foreign banks. It proved 
that, foreign banks would potentially face a robust financial market. 
 
It is interesting to look at the entries of foreign banks in developing 
countries, since it’s a decisive characteristic of the marvelous changes of 
the ownership structure of the banking system. This paper is written with 
 
2 The Chinese currency. 
3 The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. 
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the following structure: Section 2 examines the factors that affect the entry 
decision of foreign banks into developing countries. Section 3 addresses 
the activities and organizational forms of foreign banks’ entries. Section 
4--the highlight of this paper, attempts to analyze the impacts of the foreign 
banks’ entries in developing countries. Section 5 analyzes foreign banks’ 
entries into China and Poland and section 6 consists of a conclusion. 
 
 What drive foreign banks into the developing countries? 
 
There are a number of factors that affect the entry decision of foreign 
banks. Firstly, the economic relationship between the home and host 
countries of a foreign bank is positively correlated with the scale of its 
entry4. Secondly, the financial markets in developing countries are mainly 
unsaturated, so there exist many opportunities for foreign banks to make a 
profit. Thirdly, the regulations5 performed in developing countries have 
impacts on foreign banks´ decisions on entry. Fourthly, the geographical 
proximity, economical similarities, similar culture and habits, and same 
languages are also decisive for foreign banks’ entries.6 
 
 
 
 
 
4 It is determined by the foreign direct investment in the banking system. 
5 For example, preferential tariff treatment. 
6 Clarke et al. (2003) have also mentioned these factors. Their study focused on the factors that drove 
foreign banks´ entry in developed countries. But we consider the factors that drive foreign banks´ entry in 
developing countries. 
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2.1 The economic relationship between a foreign bank´ s home and 
st countries 
         
Many empirical studies demonstrate that there is a positively 
correlated relationship between the scale of foreign banks´ entries and the 
economic relationship between the foreign bank´s home and host 
countries. If the host country is economically well integrated with the home 
country of a foreign bank, the foreign bank will invest a lot in the host 
country. Some studies analyze foreign banks´ activities both in America 
and in England.7 Others focus on the behavior of foreign banks from the 
same country but into different host countries.8 For example, they analyze 
the performance of foreign banks from England, U.S.A., Japan and 
Germany in other countries. Generally, most of these studies focus on the 
relationship between the degree of economic integration and foreign 
banks´ entries. They also reached the same conclusion that “banks desire 
to serve their customers abroad”, the so-called “follow the clients” 
motivation.9  
 
However, most of the studies above only refer to the entry decision of 
foreign banks in developed countries. In fact, the “follow the clients” 
motivation of foreign banks is difficult to verify in developing countries. By 
analyzing the behavior of American banks in 32 countries between 1987 
and 1995, Miller and Parkhe (1998) find no positive correlation between the 
amount of foreign direct investment and the scale of foreign banks´ 
participation in developing countries. Of course, there may be another 
 
7 The so called “ from-many-to-one-host”. 
8 The so called “ from-one-to-many-hosts ”. 
9 Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria and Sánchez (2003). 
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possibility that in developing countries, foreign banks face relative weaker 
competition. So they are able to gain more benefits than the domestic 
banks in the process of providing financial services. From this point of view, 
the foreign banks may enter earlier than the foreign-funded enterprises in 
the non-financial sector.  
       
 The profitable opportunities in the host country 
 
Much recent research has shown that foreign banks are mostly 
attracted by the great profitable opportunities in developing countries. 
There are several indicators that are relevant to the foreign banks’ decision 
on entering developing countries. Claessens, Stijn and Jansen (2000) have 
analyzed the data from 1988 to 1995 in 80 countries and found that foreign 
banks are attracted by the low tariff and high return on capital in host 
countries. Yamori (1998) shows that Japanese banks always consider the 
GDP per capita as a decisive factor affecting their entry decision. Brealey 
and Kaplanis (1996) and Buch (2000) find that the higher the host counties’ 
GDP, the more the foreign banks’ entries. 
 
Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000) have used more variables to analyze the 
opportunities in the host countries. They have chosen 143 banks in 28 
countries and each bank has at least one foreign shareholder. Besides the 
economic relationship between the home and host country and the 
regulatory barriers in the host country, they have also analyzed the 
economic prospects and the degree of competition in the host country. 
They find that foreign banks are willing to enter the countries where the 
 11
                                                
expected economic growth is high and the efficiency in the banking sector 
is low. With respect to the expected economic growth, the foreign banks´ 
entries are negatively correlated with the GDP per capita and the inflation 
rate in the host country. But in terms of the efficiency in the banking system, 
if the host country has higher average costs, lower net interest margin and 
larger amount of cash flow,10 it will be more attractive for foreign banks´ 
entries.  
 
Although most of these 28 countries are developed countries, there 
are a few developing countries among them, for example, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Mexico and Poland. The banking system in developing countries 
is relatively weak, foreign banks may have obvious competitive 
advantages. Therefore, their study shows another implication, that foreign 
banks enter developing countries for the purpose of profitable 
opportunities. For example, most of the foreign banks in Hungary have 
developed into retailing banks. They both receive deposits and make loans. 
 
All the mentioned above studies show that the foreign banks are 
interested in profitable opportunities. Of course, if the foreign banks don’t 
give up some market segments after the entries, for example, the small 
firms11, the entries can bring the host countries significant profits. 
  
 
 
 
 
10 In this situation, the capital utilization is inefficient. 
11 They usually receive less financial services than large firms. 
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2.3 The regulations in the host country 
 
From a political perspective, the strict regulations on the foreign banks’ 
entries into the host counties may form large obstacles for the new 
entrants. Such strict restrictions don’t only hurt the benign competition 
between the foreign banks and domestic banks, but also protect the 
inefficient domestic banking system unfairly. Buch and De Long (2004) 
show that, foreign banks are less likely to consider an international merger 
with a developing county with a strictly regulated financial system. Focarelli 
and Pozzolo (2001) have also found similar results. They argue that more 
foreign investment can be attracted to a developing country with less strict 
regulations.  Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) find that if the banking 
sector is less regulated, the net interest margin and the overhead costs will 
be lower. Furthermore, they have also shown that fewer restrictions 
towards foreign banks and the banking capital can contribute to a lower 
probability of banking crises.  
 
Some developing countries formulate some preferential tariff 
treatments when dealing with foreign banks, for example, Argentina, Chile 
and China. In China, the income tax rate for local enterprises is 33% which 
is consistent with the international standard. The income tax rate is 55% for 
the professional banks, and 33% for the commercial banks. In contrast, the 
foreign banks can enjoy a preferential income tax rate raging from 15% to 
30%, if they are located in the special economic regions or in the coastal 
cities. Most of the foreign banks can also enjoy a preferential sales tax. 
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However, other developing countries make some special regulations, 
for instance, North Korea and Egypt. According to Hao, Hunter and Yang 
(2000)12, the country which is less open to foreign banks can gain more 
benefits from their entries. 
 The similarities between the home and host countries 
 
Many studies have also argued that it is very important to regard the 
geographical proximity, economical similarities, similar culture and habits 
and same language as priority for foreign banks to make a decision on 
entry. Claessens and Van Horen (2006) find that, if the foreign bank’s home 
and host countries are neighbor countries, or the people speak the same 
language or the host country was historically a colony of foreign bank’s 
home country, the foreign bank prefers to develop new business in this host 
country. 
 
For the normal firms, they usually expand the scale of their business 
overseas by using their competitive advantages which results out of prior 
business experience (Casson, 1987). In which environment can the early 
experience be applied most efficiently? Undoubtedly it is in a country with a 
similar environment as the countries where the firms have already 
developed business. The skills which they are good at can help them do a 
better business in a similar environment (Buckley and Casson, 1991). 
 
Things are the same for the banks. Many foreign banks have 
competitive advantages because they can utilize their prior experience 
 
12 They have analyzed the banking efficiency in North Korea after foreign bank’s entries.  
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formed in the earlier business. Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Rajan 
(1998) have shown that, in a similar environment, where foreign banks 
have already successfully developed business, it is easy for them to 
triumph over the competition.  
         
Generally, the similarity between the home and host countries of a 
foreign bank includes similar institutional situations, degree of openness 
and level of corruption. Claessens and Van Horen (2006) argue that, if a 
foreign bank develops its competitive advantages in an institutionally 
transparent environment, it will be more likely to use its competitive 
advantages in countries with a similar institutional environment. Galindo, 
Micco, and Serra (2003) also find that, if there are large differences 
between a foreign bank’s home and host countries, the costs of foreign 
banks’ entries may outweigh the benefits and finally lead to the withdrawal 
of foreign banks. 
 
Furthermore, studies such as Claessens and Van Horen (2006) have 
pointed out another important factor in addition to the institutional 
differences that affects the entry decision of foreign banks. It is the 
institutional quality of the foreign counterparts of a foreign bank. By 
comparing empirical data, which was collected in developing countries, 
they find that it is very important for a foreign bank to know what its foreign 
competitors are doing. A foreign bank can have a better start in developing 
countries, if it can ascertain the advantages of his competitors and update 
its competitive advantages continuously. 
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3.1
3. What do the foreign banks do in the developing 
ntries? 
 
 Their activities 
 
In the previous section, we have already argued that foreign banks 
enter developing countries not for the reason of following their clients but 
because of the great profitable opportunities and a proper institutional and 
macroeconomic environment. What kinds of activities do foreign banks 
really undertake? 
 
Several studies have examined the activities of foreign banks in 
developing countries. They indicate that there exists a strong competition 
between foreign banks and domestic banks in the banking sector. Foreign 
banks perform more efficiently than the domestic ones. As proved also by 
Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001), Claessens and Laeven 
(2003), and Claessens and Lee (2003), foreign banks’ intelligent way of 
doing business in developing countries brings them marvelous gains and 
the early successful operating experiences of doing business in developed 
countries give them more competitive advantages over the local banks.  
 
    According to the neoclassical theory, the growing financial integration 
can help the growth of the banking segment in developing countries. The 
reason for this is as follows. Firstly, in developing countries, the savings 
level is lower, but the growth of opportunities is higher than that in 
developed countries. The dynamic growing opportunities in the banking 
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segment attract the inflow of foreign capital. Secondly, the stock market in 
developing countries is usually not well developed. The number of listed 
firms is very small (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998)). Therefore, to a large extent, the new comers on the market and 
investment contribute mainly to the expected growth. However, if the stock 
market is inefficient and the investors fail to receive good protection from 
the unlisted-firms, another path of investment must be found to offset the 
moral hazard. A most efficient way of funding investment is through the 
credit from banks (Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) 
and Giannetti (2003)). In a word, foreign banks can help the unlisted-firms 
go through the tough situation with an invaluable support of capital. 
 
It is easier for foreign banks relative to domestic banks to get foreign 
capital, so they can stably fund firms externally. However, if foreign banks 
lend to favored partners, there exists the danger that they may damage the 
lending in the local banking segment. (Laeven (2001) and La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Zamarripa (2003)) The firms which are favored 
partners of foreign banks may get investment under any circumstances 
even if they are inefficient. In contrast, the newly-established firms may 
only be treated with credit rationing even if they perform more efficiently 
and have better prospects. In the meantime, foreign banks are usually not 
well connected with individual customers and the local government. As a 
consequence, they avoid providing credit to state-owned firms and mainly 
lend to the firms with better prospects. 
  
According to Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria and Sánchez (2003), 
commercial and industrial loans are the main components of foreign banks’ 
 17
                                                
lending portfolio, supporting the argument that foreign banks lend more to 
large firms. Figure 1 13shows the classification of foreign banks´ business 
in China. In 2007, 82.5% of the banks regard trade financing as the major 
area of specialization (increased by 5.35% than in 2005). The corporate 
and financial banking take the second place with 70% (increased by 10% 
than in 2005). In the third place are retail and commercial banking with 
42.5% (increased by 11.07% than in 2005). The corporate and institutional 
banking take the fourth place with 37.5% (decreased by 12.5%). We can 
find the similar situation in Argentina. Clarke, Cull, D´Amato and Molinari 
(2000) show that, in the last few decades of the 20th century, foreign banks´ 
industrial loans accounted for about 35% of their lending portfolio, 15% 
higher than the percentage of commercial loans in private domestic banks’ 
portfolio and 25% higher than that of state-owned banks. 
 
On the other hand, asymmetric information and a weak legal system in 
developing countries are usually obstacles for small firms to benefit from 
the entries of foreign banks (Acharya, Sundaram and John (2004)). As we 
have discussed above, it is difficult for foreign banks to develop a well 
connected relationship with private customers and the local government. 
Therefore, they can not get adequate local information. To do business with 
small firms, they should be able to get enough soft-information by 
decentralization. “The soft-information is the information which is difficult to 
completely summarize in a numeric score.”14 However, most of the foreign 
banks have a complicated hierarchy and complicate the decentralization of 
decision-making power. As a consequence, the foreign banks intend to 
 
13 Mervyn Jacob, 2007, “Foreign Banks in China-Financial Services, Banking and Capital Markets”, 
second Price Water House Coopers Survey. He is the financial services leader for China and Hong Kong. 
He made a survey of 40 foreign banks in 2007 in China and compared the results with those got in 2005.  
14 M. A. Petersen, 2004, “Information: Hard and Soft”. 
concentrate on funding large firms. As emphasized by Clarke, Cull, 
Martinez Peria and Sánchez (2003), foreign banks’ entries do indeed bring 
benefits to small firms. However, in comparison to large firms, these 
benefits are much smaller.  
 
Figure 1:   
Classification of Foreign Banks´ Business in China  
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3.2 The patterns of the entry and the forms of the organization 
 
With the rapid development of financial system, foreign banks update 
their entry strategy over the time. The main points of their entry strategy 
 18
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can be defined as the patterns of the entry and the forms of the 
organization.  
 
As mentioned in the empirical study of Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria and 
Sánchez (2003), as early as in 1970s, foreign banks in Egypt were only 
allowed to enter developing countries in the form of joint ventures with the 
state-owned banks. Things have been different since in the early years of 
21st century. The government has been trying to get rid of the limitation of 
joint ventures (Caprio and Cull (2000)). In other cases, in the 1990s in 
China, the banking licenses were limited in number by the Chinese 
government. In order to protect domestic banks, foreign banks can only 
either merge with the Chinese banks or buy the licenses from Chinese 
banks. Nowadays, the Chinese government welcomes foreign banks and 
allows them to serve all of the Chinese customers in the same way as 
Chinese banks (Huang and Xiong (2006)). 
 
There are mainly four kinds of entry patterns that foreign banks use 
entering developing countries: solely foreign- invested banks, joint venture, 
acquisitions and mergers. 
 
As discussed above, in general, there exists a relatively undeveloped 
financial system in developing countries. Therefore, joint venture, 
acquisitions and mergers are three typical modes preferred by domestic 
banks in the case of foreign banks´ entries (Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria 
and Sánchez, 2003). For instance, nowadays in china, most of the foreign 
banks choose joint venture as the entry mode. They share with the Chinese 
banks the stock ownership in the new unit and the proportion of their stock 
 20
shares becomes gradually larger. By the end of September, 2006, there 
were 29 foreign banks forming joint ventures with 21 Chinese banks. 
Generally, they were not allowed to form joint ventures with the four largest 
state-owned Chinese banks, but with the financial reform of the banking 
sector, the further target joint venture partners of foreign banks are these 
four Chinese banks.    
 
These three kinds of entry modes benefit the both sides. On the one 
hand, the important skills of foreign banks, such as the innovation of 
financial products and risk management technologies, can help the local 
banks` development. On the other hand, through acquisition, the foreign 
banks can enter the local market faster and more easily. In some 
developing countries, joint venture is the only allowable entry mode of 
foreign banks. Furthermore, the domestic banks are well connected with 
local customers and the government. Through cooperating with each other, 
the foreign banks are able to take advantage of the established 
relation-network to develop business. 
 
A coin has always two sides. Other empirical studies have also shown 
that foreign banks lend less to small firms than domestic banks. If many 
domestic banks are bought by, or merged with foreign banks, the small 
firms will lose the credit provision from these domestic banks and as a 
result, their business will get into hot water.  
 
There are many arguments about the impacts of the banks acquisition 
on the credit provision. Several studies have argued that small firms´ loss 
of credit from some domestic banks can be offset by the new credit of other 
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banks. Because if some domestic banks merge with foreign banks, they will 
form a larger entity than other banks that haven’t merged. They 
concentrate on lending to large firms. In order to compete with the large 
foreign banks, the other banks tend to lend more to small firms (Berger, 
Saunders, Scalise, Udell (1998) and Avery and Samolyk (2000)). However, 
this kind of “external effect” seems to be doubtable in some other studies. 
Berger, Goldberg and White (2001) find that, even if the decrease in 
lending to small firms is offset by the increasing lending of other banks, in 
the process of building new relationships with new partners, small firms´ 
searching and controlling costs will be higher. Furthermore, the demand of 
small firms for the term structure of the loans is also difficult to meet until a 
mature business relationship is fully established between them and the 
banks. 
          
There are several kinds of organizational forms which can be used by 
foreign banks after entering. According to Goldberg (1992), the most 
general and easiest form of foreign bank’s organization is the 
representative office, but it is subject to the most limitations. It can neither 
accept deposits, nor make loans. It is only the agent of the foreign bank’s 
home country. The main purpose of representative offices is to serve the 
customers from home countries and to examine the potential opportunity of 
doing business in the host country. Therefore, they are not resource 
intensive.  
 
By contrast, the agency is a more advanced form. Although in many 
countries, it is not allowed to take deposits, it can make loans. One method 
that is similar to make deposits is to keep the credit balance. This method is 
 22
often used by agencies, but foreign banks are not allowed to make 
payment using this account (Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria and Sánchez 
(2003)). 
 
The two forms mentioned above cannot cover the entire banking 
services in a host country. Therefore, most of the profit and risk brought by 
foreign banks are due to two other kinds of organizational forms—the 
branch and the subsidiary.  
 
Branches belong completely to their parent banks. They are preferred 
because they offer more services than representative offices and agencies. 
They can provide all the services that their parent bank can. They are often 
engaged in the wholesale market and their liabilities have an impact on 
their parent bank’s equity (Goldberg (1992) and Miller and Parkhe (1998)). 
One shortcoming is that their behavior is limited by the regulations both 
from host and from home countries. It means that they might be less 
competitive, because the domestic banks face only the local regulations. 
For example, if the home country of a foreign bank forbids the universal 
banking, but the host country doesn’t, this foreign bank may not choose 
such a branch as its entry mode. 
  
In comparison to Branches, subsidiaries immerse fully in host 
countries, but are owned by a foreign company. Their liabilities are not 
backed by the assets of the parent bank. It means that their behavior is not 
limited by the regulations in the home country and they can provide the 
same services as domestic banks. Therefore, they can compete with 
domestic banks more easily.  
 23
 
Miller and Parkhe (1998) have analyzed the international business of 
American banks. They find that the host country can affect the entry mode 
of the foreign bank. If the host country allows diversified business, most 
foreign banks choose subsidiary as their organizational form, because the 
branches are strictly regulated. Furthermore, if there are high tariff and 
strict regulations in the host country, foreign banks may decide on other 
forms instead of subsidiaries. 
 
A number of recent papers have focused on the intra-border lending 
behavior of foreign banks in developing countries (Clarke, Cull, D’Amato 
and Molinari (2000); Claessens, Demirgűç-Kunt, and Huizinga (2000); 
Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000); Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000)), but 
they have not taken the cross-border lending into account, which is also a 
very decisive source of credit for developing countries. The cross-border 
lending is defined as an inflow of credit from a financial institution in a 
foreign country, to a host country. In contrast, if a foreign bank has 
established a subsidiary in a host country, its lending behavior is called 
foreign direct investment. Generally, large foreign banks, such as foreign 
banks from U.S. do both the cross-border lending and the subsidiary 
services (Christian Weller (1998)). According to Peek and Rosengren 
(2000b) and Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria and Sánchez (2003), by the end of 
1990s, Latin America had received more credit through cross-border 
lending than that provided by the foreign banks in Latin-America.  
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4.1
4. What are the impacts of foreign banks in developing 
untries? 
 
 The positive impacts 
 
As we have discussed above, a number of foreign banks have entered 
developing countries due to the attractive financial opportunities. They 
apply proper organizational forms to do a better business and therefore can 
get more benefits.   
 
By 2001, the assets in foreign banks` accounts have taken 46% of the 
overall assets in the banking segment in developing countries (Clarke, Cull, 
Martínez Pería (2006)). For instance, since China has signed the WTO 
agreement in 2001, there are more and more foreign banks entering the 
Chinese financial market. By 2007, 74 foreign banks had entered China 
and in 2007, 186 more representative offices were established. By 2010 
the number of foreign banks is expected to reach 85. Even so, China keeps 
applying an open strategy towards foreign banks. The reason is that by 
competing with foreign banks, the Chinese domestic banks can strengthen 
their competitive advantages and reap more benefits (Jacob, 2007). 
 
The major benefits brought by the foreign banks are as follows. Firstly, 
foreign banks´ entries can help enhance the competition and efficiency of 
the local banking sector. The growth of the competition can also contribute 
to the decrease on the costs of local banks. Therefore, they can gain more 
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profits.15 Secondly, foreign banks are more stable credit providers. They 
can get more capital from the home countries and can enter the 
international market more easily. This fact has a big impact on the local 
financial market. Thirdly, the allocation of the resource of credit can be 
improved due to the better evaluation and pricing technologies of credit risk 
(Barth et al (2001)). Fourthly, after the financial crises in host countries, 
foreign banks tend to reduce the costs of capital in these countries (World 
Bank, (2002)).  
 
4.1.1Competition and efficiency 
 
One main point of view of the advocators of foreign banks´ entries is 
that the foreign participation can improve the efficiency and competition in 
the local banking segment.  
 
According to several studies, foreign banks have strengthened the 
competition and efficiency in the banking sector. Unite and Sullivan (2002) 
have shown that the efficiency and competition of the banking segment in 
developing countries are generally improved by the growing entries of 
foreign banks and the increasing foreign ownerships of local banks. 
Foreign banks´ entries help reduce the interest rate and the operation costs 
of domestic banks. As a result, the local banks become more competitive. 
Denizer (2000) has studied the foreign banks´ behavior in Turkey from 
1980 to 1997 and found that foreign banks make the overhead costs of the 
banking sector lower and therefore improve the efficiency and competition 
 
15 World Bank, 2001, “Finance for Growth: Policy Choices in a Volatile World”, Washington, D.C. 
in Turkey. Uiboupin (2004) has done a research on the performance of 219 
banks in ten16 Central and Eastern European countries from 1995 to 2001. 
His findings are consistent with the argument that foreign banks can 
contribute to lower interest rates and overhead costs. 
  
In the case of Latin America, the fact is that foreign banks´ 
performance is more efficient than domestic banks` due to their lower 
overhead costs (as showed in figure 2). 
 
Figure 2:  
Comparison of the Performance between Foreign and Domestic 
Private Banks in Latin America17  
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In figure 2, all of the three indicators are measured as the percentage 
of the total assets. We can find that the overhead costs of foreign banks are 
0.7%, 0.3% lower than that of domestic banks. The net margin is calculated 
as the net interest income over total assets. Although the foreign banks´ net 
                                                 
16 They are Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia 
and Slovakia. 
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17 Source: International Data Base Calculations. 
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interest income is 1.7% lower, but their lower overhead costs make them 
keep the profitability similar to the local banks. For both foreign and 
domestic banks, the average return on assets is about 0.2%. This diagram 
shows only the average level, but in fact, the countries in Latin America 
have different figures. In Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and 
Peru, foreign banks have lower overhead costs, but in Bolivia and 
Guatemala, the overhead costs of foreign banks are higher. Colombia and 
Honduras are the only two countries in Latin America where foreign banks 
have higher net interest income (Barajas, Steiner, and Salazar, (2000)). 
   
The local banks are likely to find it difficult to protect their profits, 
because the foreign banks´ entry is always correlated with both lower 
overhead costs and a provision of high-quality loans. As detailed in 
Barajas, Steiner and Salazar’s study (2000), in Colombia, foreign banks are 
characterized with lower spreads and higher loan quality. Using OLS 
regression, they find that in order to make more profits, the new entrants, 
whether domestic or foreign ones, are likely to make lower spreads than 
the already established banks. Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria and Sánchez 
(2003) show that the foreign banks´ entries make the organizational forms 
and the regulatory system of the banking sector in Colombia change. On 
the other hand, they find that although the non-financial costs are lower for 
both foreign and domestic banks, domestic banks have more 
non-performance loans. Furthermore, the new foreign banks can lower the 
spread only among foreign banks, but the new local banks can lower the 
spread in the whole banking segment. This implies the fact that, the foreign 
banks in Colombia provide too limited services in the banking segment to 
compete with domestic banks completely. 
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Clarke, Cull, D´Amato and Molinari (2000) and Clarke, Cull, Martinez 
Peria and Sánchez (2003) have also found the similar trend in Argentina in 
the late 1990´s. Foreign banks don’t enter all financial segments. They 
enter only the segments where they can use their historically successful 
experience or where they have enough competitive advantages to make 
them successful in the competition with domestic banks.  
 
In Mexico, no evidence has proved that foreign banks can increase 
competition and efficiency. Haber and Musacchio (2005) find that in 
Mexico, the banking segment is very concentrated. Foreign banks´ entries 
reduce the lending. Schulz (2006) has studied the foreign banks´ entries 
between 1997 and 2004 in Mexico and found no evidence that the foreign 
banks can improve the efficiency of the banking segment. One possible 
reason is the lack of competition in the financial market. 
 
Some other empirical studies show that foreign banks can lead to 
lower benefits and net margins of domestic banks (Classens, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001)). Analyzing the data in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico and Peru, 
Levy-Yeyati and Micco (2007) find that the competition in the banking 
sector becomes weaker due to foreign banks´ entries. 
 
In summary, foreign banks can improve the competition and efficiency 
of the local banking segment in developing countries, where the financial 
system is less concentrated and regulated, and the entrance and exit of 
foreign banks are relatively easy.  
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4.1.2 Stability 
 
Foreign banks can provide credits more stably. On the one hand, they 
can enter the international financial market more easily and get more 
capital from their home countries. On the other hand, if financial crisis 
happens in host countries, they tend to be more stable lenders than 
domestic banks. According to Goldberg (2002), the financial crises in host 
countries haven’t influenced the U.S. banks’ lending activities. Demirgüç- 
Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Demirgüç- Kunt, Levine, and Min (1999) and 
Levine (1999) have also shown that the foreign banks’ participation in 
developing countries can make the probability of banking crises smaller. 
 
In the case of the Tequila crisis in Argentina and Mexico from 
1994-1995, foreign banks have been found with higher loan growth rates 
than domestic banks and helped reduce the credit risk in Argentina and 
Mexico (Goldberg, Dages and Kinney, 2000). Peek and Rosengren 
(2000b)18  and Crystal, Dages and Goldberg (2001)19reached the similar 
conclusions. 
 
During the Asian financial crisis from 1997 to 1998 in Malaysia, all the 
foreign banks kept the lending behavior (Detragiache and Gupta, 2006). 
Examining the reaction of foreign banks and domestic banks in ten20 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to the financial crises from 1993-2000, 
De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006) have found that during crises domestic 
banks reduced their lending, but foreign banks still kept their lending level. 
 
18 They analyzed foreign banks´ direct and cross-country lending between 1994 and 1999 in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico. 
19 Their study is based on the data of bank levels in the late 1990s in Argentina, Chile and Colombia. 
20 They are Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia. 
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Foreign banks can facilitate the competition and cooperation between 
banks in developing countries and therefore stabilize the banking sector. 
As we have mentioned above, the efficiency of the banking sector in 
developing countries is weak. After foreign banks´ entries, the local 
financial services become more diversified, and to defeat the competition, 
the local banks try to improve the management, enhance the efficiency and 
develop new financial services. They try to reduce their costs and charges 
and therefore help make the financial system more stable. Levine (1996) 
argues that after foreign banks´ entries, the cooperation between the 
foreign and local banks helps enhance the evaluation level of the local 
banks, reduce the financial risk and improve the stability of the whole 
financial system. By analyzing the data in 107 countries, Barth, Capio and 
Livine (2004) and Haber and Musacchio (2005) have also argued that 
foreign banks help improve the stability of the local banking sector. 
 
On the other hand, foreign banks can help improve the capital base, 
strengthen the risk management, decentralize the risk and increase the 
provision for bad debts. They can reduce the risk by providing more capital 
mobility.  
 
Although in the short term, foreign banks` entries may make the local 
banking sector unstable, in the long term, by competing with foreign banks, 
the local banks can gain more valuable experience and loyal customers. As 
a result, the business environment of local banks becomes more stable.   
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4.1.3 Access to credit 
 
During the process of foreign banks’ participation in developing 
countries, a debatable point may be whether the foreign banks contribute to 
the provision of credit, in particular for small firms. Some empirical studies 
show that foreign banks have a global access to the credit market, are 
diversified among the local firms and maintain a high level of lending. 
Although some studies show that foreign banks tend to concentrate on 
lending to profitable and transparent customers and finance only selectively 
a few segments of the market, they can make domestic banks move to 
small firms. As a result, the credit of small firms is enhanced.  
         
As showed by Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001), Detragiache, Gupta, 
and Tressel (2005), and Mian (2006), most foreign banks limit their lending 
services only to large firms.21 By comparing the available data on loans of 
different sizes of banks in Argentina in 1998, Berger, Klapper and Udell 
(2001) show that it is more difficult for small firms to gain credit from foreign 
banks. Using the data of lending portfolios in Pakistan over seven years, 
Mian (2006) finds that domestic banks in Pakistan lend more to small firms. 
Detragiache, Gupta and Tressel (2005) argue that if foreign banks focus on 
serving the high-end customers, they need to be more high-tech and 
therefore they are subject to less aggregate credit, higher operational risk 
and lower benefits.   
        
 
21 These foreign banks are so-called “ cherry pickers”, because they serve only the profitable and 
transparent customers. 
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Some other studies have discussed the indirect impacts of foreign 
banks on the credit provision to small firms. On the one hand, foreign banks 
can facilitate the financing environment. Using the data of the foreign 
banks´ lending behavior, Clarke, Cull, and Martinez Peria (2001) have 
analyzed the impacts of foreign banks on the credit of local firms and find 
that foreign banks help improve the competition, reduce the interest rate 
and enhance the financing conditions in the developing countries. Giannetti 
and Ongena (2005) show that the firm sales, assets and leverage ratio 
have been improved by foreign banks’ lending, but large firms benefit more 
than small ones. Using the data of a survey of foreign banks´ lending 
behavior in more than 3000 firms in developing countries, Clarke, Cull and 
Martinez Peria (2006) find that due to foreign banks´ entries, firms will face 
less restrictions of financing.  
 
On the other hand, foreign banks can affect the lending behavior of 
local banks. Bonin and Abel (2000) show that, because of the growing 
participation of foreign banks in Hungary, some local banks enlarge their 
lending to medium and small firms. By analyzing the results of a survey 
about the lending behavior of local banks in 78 countries, Jenkins (2000) 
finds that 44% of the investigated local banks enhance their credit provision 
to small firms due to the strong stress from lending to big firms. 
 
We can find some more convincing arguments from Clarke, Cull and 
Martinez Peria (2005). Using data from four Latin-America countries22, they 
find that foreign banks indeed lend less to small firms than local banks. 
However, no data is available about the different lending behavior between 
 
22 These four countries are Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Peru. 
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4.2
the large foreign and local banks. It is possible that small firms may gain 
more credit from large foreign banks than from large domestic ones. 
 
To summarize, small and opaque firms may get less credit from 
foreign banks than the large ones. Foreign banks, however, can improve 
the financing environment and make the local banks lend more to small 
firms. Therefore, they indirectly facilitate the credit provision. 
 
 The negative impacts 
             
In the short term, foreign banks´ entries may also bring the host 
counties some unstable factors. Firstly, foreign banks may transmit the 
financial shocks from the home to the host countries and make the local 
financial system unstable. Secondly, the foreign banks´ strategies may be 
inconsistent with the sustainable development strategies of host countries. 
The sudden withdrawal of investment leads to instability. Thirdly, the 
increasing entries of foreign banks may lead to the reduction of the 
franchise value of local banks. Therefore, the domestic banks may do 
some risky business (Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000)). Fourthly, the 
increasing entries of foreign banks may lead to the excessive liberalization 
of the local financial market and cause the financial crisis.  
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4.2.1 Transmitting shocks from home to host countries 
 
Several studies have argued that foreign banks can be affected by the 
shocks in their home countries and transmit them to the host countries. The 
regional disputes, political issues and financial crises can make foreign 
banks insolvent and go bankrupt. Analyzing the international economical 
situations and the characteristics of the capital mobility, we know that the 
financial incapability of a country, even of an institution can force local 
banks and their foreign partners into tough situation.  
 
Martinez Peria, Powell and Vladkova-Holler (2005) have analyzed the 
lending behavior of foreign banks from the seven most important lenders23 
of Latin America from 1985 to 2000. They find that the banks transmit 
shocks from their home countries to the host countries. Although they have 
verified that the lower growth rate of the financial market and the less 
profitable opportunities in developed countries make more and more banks 
expand their business in developing countries, the economic depression 
and financial crises in the home countries can result in the deterioration of 
the capital sources and the decline of the credit provision. Furthermore, the 
low real interest rate in home countries makes banks lend riskier and higher 
interest rate loans to developing countries, and it leads to the instable 
provision of the credit.   
 
Goldberg (2001) has also studied the lending performance of U.S 
banks in developing countries from 1985 to 2000. He finds that the shocks 
happening in the U.S. affected the U.S. banks’ foreign lending a lot. The 
 
23 They are Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, the UK, and the U. S.. 
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lower the U.S. GDP growth and the U.S. interest rate, the less stable the 
U.S. banks´ credit provision. 
               
4.2.2 The inconsistent developing strategies 
 
Foreign banks in host countries must follow their parent banks´ 
international strategy. Therefore, they are to a large extent affected by the 
parent banks and may be harmful to the stability of the local financial 
system.  
 
Agenor (2000) has shown that many foreign banks are not familiar with 
the local markets, especially the emerging markets. Once they encounter 
large difficulties, they may withdraw and leave the local financial market 
unstable. The withdrawal of investment of foreign banks is different from 
the bankruptcy of local banks. The purpose of foreign banks is to make 
profits, and they don’t care much about the sustainable development of 
economy and society and the benefits to the host countries. Therefore, 
foreign banks may violate the operating disciplines in the local market, 
especially when the financial supervision is weak. In order to attract the 
foreign investment, many developing countries relax the supervision over 
foreign banks. It leads to the unfair competition.   
 
According to Ma (2004), there are several illegal activities taken by 
foreign banks in China. Firstly, they transfer profits from host to home 
countries and make the local government suffer heavy revenue losses. 
They ask the parent banks for high interest rate loans, and in the 
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meantime, they remit the locally received low interest rate deposits to the 
parent banks. Secondly, they absorb local deposits excessively. Generally, 
the deposits received by foreign banks in China  can´t be more than 40% 
of  their total assets. However, many foreign banks receive deposits 
exceeding this level largely.Thirdly, many foreign banks don´t  have the 
required operating capital. Some foreign banks keep their operationg 
capital in the home countries or reallocate it time after time. The current 
assets of many foreign banks can´t reach the level of the minimum 
requirement. According to the Chinese Banking Law, the proportion of the 
current assets to the deposits of foreign banks can´t be higher than 25%. In 
fact, in many foreign banks, the proportion is just around 10%. Fourthly, 
they use some illegal competiton ways in the settlement services, for 
example, charging for lower handling fees and inviting customers to travel 
abroad. In the process of the remittance service, some foreign banks allow 
the absence of  some important identification, and  even accept fake 
certificates. Fifthly, they don´t pay the deposits reserves to The Bank of 
China on time or don´t pay the full amount.  
 
All of the mentioned above illegal activities of foreign banks impact the 
fair competition and the financial stability negatively in the local banking 
sector.   
 
4.2.3 The decrease of local banks´ franchise value  
 
As we have discussed above, the “Cherry Picking” strategy is widely 
used by foreign banks in developing countries. They focus on serving the 
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profitable and transparent customers and may lower the franchise value of 
local banks. Foreign banks compete dramatically with the local banks for 
serving the high-level customers. As a result, the profitability of local banks 
decreases.  
 
Comparing with local banks, foreign banks have many competitive 
advantages. Firstly, according to Miller and Parkhe (1998), in comparison 
with local banks, foreign banks are good at providing diversified and 
high-tech financial products, intermediary services, foreign exchange 
services and innovative services. They are diversified among the 
customers and have advantages in the field of capital mobility 
management, advanced financial services and consulting management. 
Their aim is not to serve all the customers, but to concentrate on the 
profitable and solvent enterprises. Secondly, foreign banks follow the 
international conventions and their business is basically not intervened by 
the government. Thirdly, they are mainly with a large scale, a strong capital 
base and well performing loans. According to Tao (2002), in 2000, the total 
capital of the U. S. Citibank Group was about 700 billion U.S. dollars, which 
was as much as the overall capital of the four largest state-owned banks in 
China. Its earning before tax was ten times as much as that of all the four 
largest state-owned Chinese banks. The proportion of the non-performing 
capital of American commercial banks accounted for only 0.67%. However, 
the large proportion of non-performing capital made the Chinese banks 
operate inefficiently and riskily. For example, in 2000, the proportion of 
non-performing capital of Tian Jin Commercial Bank24 was 31.9%, which 
was 7.6% higher than that in 1999.   
 
24 It is a stat-owned bank in  China. 
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In order to keep the market shares, the local banks may enlarge the 
amount of risky loans. It leads to the increase on non-performing loans and 
operational risk. 
 
.4 The excessive liberalization of the financial system 
 
The growing entries of foreign banks make lots of foreign capital flow 
into host countries and improve the local liberalization of the financial 
system.  However, the excessive liberalization may make the local 
banking sector unstable and stimulate financial crises. 
 
Take Thailand as an example, before the Asian financial crisis 
happened, the local government advocated the liberalization of Thai 
financial system actively. More and more foreign banks entered Thailand 
and improved the liberalization process. In the meanwhile, they brought 
some unstable factors which could speed up the financial crises. Firstly, 
large amounts of inflow of foreign capital made the proportion of short-term 
foreign debts account for more than 50%. Secondly, lots of foreign capital 
flowed into real estate business. The financial institutions lent more than 
25% of their loans in this field. Most of the houses were vacant and the 
house-sellers faced the exchange rate risk. They received foreign currency 
from the foreign banks, but the customers paid with Satangs25. Thirdly, 
there were few regulations for foreign banks. They could withdraw the 
investment at any time. All of the factors above lead to the Asia Financial 
 
25 Satang is the currency in Thailand. 
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Crisis in September, 1997. As a result, Thailand suffered heavy losses. 
Only between September, 1997 and January, 1998, the Satangs 
depreciated by 56.7% and the price of houses fell by 35%. After the crisis, 
63 out of 91 Thai financial institutions were taken over or shut down. The 
number of private banks reduced from 15 to only four, which were not taken 
over nor controlled by foreign banks.  
 
5. Case studies of foreign banks’ entry in developing 
ntries 
 
All the mentioned above sections concentrate on the general analysis 
of foreign banks` participation in developing countries. In this section, I will 
take a close look at foreign banks entries in both China and Poland. 
 
 The entries of foreign banks in China 
 
This case study analyzes foreign banks’ development periods, the 
factors affecting their entry decision and the operational strategies of 
foreign banks in China. The focus of this case study is the adjustments and 
changes of foreign banks’ behavior since China signed the WTO 
agreement on November 10th, 2001. Then by analyzing these changes, I 
try to summarize foreign banks´ general strategy in China. Next, I compare 
some empirical analyses of foreign banks’ performance in other developing 
countries and argue the short-term effects of foreign banks’ entries on the 
local banks. 
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5.1.1 The development of foreign banks in China 
             
With the high speed of development of the Chinese economy, the 
financial system has already been the main pillar of the national economy 
and become the decisive factor which determines China’s economic future. 
As early as in the 1970s, foreign banks entered China, their performing 
situation, strategies and behavior highly attracted the attention of the 
international finance circles. Nowadays though, foreign banks’ market 
shares make up only a small part of the Chinese financial market, they 
have strong competitive advantages in some financial segments and show 
big interest in developing further services. 
 
Affected by China’s reform and open-up strategy and Chinese policies, 
foreign banks have performed differently in each period. 
 
The first period is from the end of the 1970s to the end of the 1980s. In 
this period, China performed the economic reform and many policies were 
made with only a short period in mind. Foreign banks could not find obvious 
profitability. Therefore, only several foreign banks entered China. They 
were mostly from Hong Kong, Japan, America and Europe. Another feature 
in this period is that foreign banks always chose to establish branches in 
the cities where they had partners of processing trade, for example, in 
Shenzhen and Xiamen. If they wanted to establish representative offices, 
they always decided on Beijing, with only a few exceptions. Foreign banks´ 
behavior in this period implied that to a large extent, they held the attitude 
of looking on and had not decided to invest in China on a large scale. 
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The second period is the expansion period of foreign banks´ entries 
into China, which was from 1991 to 1997. At this time, China had already 
gained some successful experience from the reform and open-up strategy, 
and there was an obvious boom in the Chinese economy attracting foreign 
banks´ attention. In the meantime, excluding the Chinese special economic 
regions, the most robust Chinese economic entity—Shanghai became the 
first location of foreign banks´ representative offices. Shanghai stock 
exchange market and Guangdong stock exchange market were 
established one after another. This event symbolized a new period of 
Chinese capital market. In 1992, the Chinese government announced that 
China would continue to develop the reform and open-up strategy more 
rapidly. 
 
Besides all the factors mentioned above, the last decade of the 20th 
century was also the time when China opened up to the foreign market to 
improve its foreign trade and to attract more foreign direct investment. The 
large amount of capital requirement desired by the foreign companies 
provided foreign banks the possibility to develop their external 
environment. Furthermore, the rapid economic development in China led to 
an increase of the interest rate. The higher interest rate of local banks 
attracted a large inflow of foreign capital through foreign banks and made 
the foreign banks more capital advantageous. As a result, more and more 
foreign companies went to foreign banks to seek credit support. 
 
The third period is the contraction period of foreign banks´ entries into 
China, which was from 1997 to 2000. The overall assets held by foreign 
banks were decreased from 37.92 billion U.S. dollars in 1997 to 31.79 
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billion U.S. dollars in 1999 (Huang and Xiong, 2006). Due to the Southeast 
Asia financial crisis in 1997, the growth rate of Chinese foreign trade 
decreased. Meanwhile, China’s main trade partners—Japan and South 
Korea were subject to large losses. This had an impact on the business 
scale of Japanese and South Korean banks in China. In 1998, China’s 
supply exceeded the demand excessively. In order to stabilize the 
development of the Chinese economy, the Chinese Central Bank 
historically, for the first time, reduced the interest rate nine times within a 
short time period. As a result, foreign banks were not capital advantageous 
any more and many foreign-invested enterprises turned to borrow from 
local banks and the business scale of foreign banks decreased. 
 
The fourth period is the new developing period of foreign banks. In 
2001, China signed the WTO agreement and announced that in two years 
foreign banks would be allowed to do Renminbi business with Chinese 
enterprises and in five years all of the regional restrictions imposed on 
foreign banks would be removed and foreign banks could provide services 
to all Chinese citizens. They could enjoy the same treatment as Chinese 
banks in application processes. In 2002, the Chinese state council 
announced several special regulations in banking segment, which provided 
foreign banks with a more detailed and exact legal base. With a more 
loosely legal environment, foreign banks did not expand their business 
largely as people expected but did business more cautiously. It implied that 
foreign banks were adjusting and changing their organizational and 
operational strategies. 
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5.1.2 The general situation of foreign bank development  
 
As early as in 1979, the first foreign bank--Export and Import Bank of 
Japan was allowed to establish representative offices in Beijing. In 1982, 
China began to import some pilot projects from foreign banks and in the 
meantime, Hong Kong Nanyang Commercial Bank was allowed to launch 
Branches in Shenzhen. In 1985, the four economic special 
regions—Xiamen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Hainan were also open to foreign 
financial institutions. In 1992, seven Chinese cities—Dalian, Tianjin, 
Qingdao, Nanjing, Ningbo, Fuzhou and Guangzhou were open to foreign 
banks. In 1995, there were a total of 24 Chinese cities open to foreign 
banks. 
 
As shown in the following Figures 3 and 4, the number of branches 
and representative offices of foreign banks has changed dramatically in 
China from 1996 to 2004.  In the period from 1996 to 1997, the number of 
branches increased from 131 to 142 and the number of representative 
offices increased from 527 to 543.  In July, 1998, the Chinese government 
removed the regional restrictions of opening institutions for foreign banks 
and as a result, the number of foreign branches increased to 162.  
 
On December 11th, 2001, China signed the WTO agreement and at the 
same time the Chinese government removed the restrictions of the 
exchange service for foreign banks and they were allowed to do Renminbi 
business formally in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin and Dalian. In 2004, 42 
foreign banks from overall 19 countries and regions built 163 branches and 
223 representative offices in China. By the end of 2006, there were a total 
of 74 foreign banks from 22 different counties and regions in China and 
they had established 200 branches in 25 cities (Mervyn, 2007).  
 
Figure 326:  
The Number of Branches Established by foreign banks in China  
from 1996 to 2004 
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26 Source: China Statistics Bureau, 2004. 
Figure 427:   
The Number of Representative Offices Established by foreign banks  
in China from 1996 to 2004 
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5.1.3 The characteristics of foreign bank distribution   
Foreign banks´ home countries are mainly Asian and European 
countries. As shown in Figure 5, by the end of 2004, 49.18% of the foreign 
banks in China were from Asia, 34.51% were from Europe, and only 
13.86% were from North America and Oceania. In Figure 6, we can see 
that, by end 2004, the most foreign banks were from Japan (65), followed 
by Hong Kong (58), America (38), French (25), England (23), Germany 
(23), Singapore (16), Thailand (15), South Korea (12) and Netherlands 
(11). 
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27 Source: China Statistics Bureau, 2004. 
Figure 528:  
The World Distribution of Foreign Banks´ Home Countries by End 
2004 
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Figure 629:  
Top-10 Home Countries of Foreign Banks by End 2004 
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In the meantime, foreign banks have mostly moved to the coastal 
cities. We can clearly find in Figure 7 that, foreign banks concentrate their 
                                                 
28 Source: China Statistics Bureau, 2004. 
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29 Source: China Statistics Bureau, 2004. 
entries on the southeast coast of china. As the most important economic 
city in China, Shanghai attracted the most foreign banks´ entries. 
Shenzhen was at the second place due to a its important position in 
China’s reform and open-up Strategy. Beijing is not a coastal city but it is 
the capital of China which was highly economically developed. All the other 
citied shown in Figure 7 are coastal cities. 
 
Figure 730: The Distribution of foreign banks in China  
By End 2004 
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5.1.4 The changes of foreign banks´ strategy in China 
 
As early as in the 1980s, foreign banks began to practice foreign 
lending in China. By experiencing so many difficulties in the past decades, 
foreign banks have understood the Chinese financial market more deeply 
and accordingly they have formed their own operational strategies. The 
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30 Source: China Statistic Bureau, 2004. 
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different histories, cultures and economic situations of the home countries 
make foreign banks use different strategies in China. 
 
Firstly, foreign banks change from geographical distribution to 
benefits-seeking distribution. Foreign banks reacted very slowly to China’s 
entry into the WTO. Comparing with the active entry of foreign banks in the 
1990s, they performed passively in recent years. They established even 
less representative offices, especially the internationally famous banks. 
They expanded almost no business in China from 2001 to 2006. The 
established organization structure and the stagnating foreign investment 
have demonstrated the mature distribution of foreign banks. However, the 
slow speed of foreign banks´ expansion made more highly trained 
employees stay in domestic banks.  
 
In order to keep the promise made in the WTO agreement, many 
restrictions towards foreign banks are abolished. The financial environment 
for foreign banks is improved and foreign banks are beginning to enhance 
the performance of local branches and remake them as new profit-centers. 
For example, in 2001, in Tianjin, foreign banks survived the deficits for 
several decades and made a profit of 17.86 million U.S. dollars. In 2002, 
most of the foreign banks in Shanghai made a profit as high as 100 million 
U.S. dollars. Another important point is that, some of the foreign banks in 
China made a profit almost as high as the world´ s average level. Take 
HSBC as an example, in 2003, HSBC´s ROA in China was 1.01%, only 
0.02% lower than the world’s average level. Such profit was made under 
the Chinese strictly regulated situation. Meanwhile, these figures showed 
foreign banks a potentially strong financial market in China. 
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On April 23rd, 2007, The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (HSBC), National City Bank of New York, Standard Chartered 
Bank and The Bank of East Asia opened to local customers to do Renminbi 
business. It implicated that foreign banks gained a new channel to make 
profits in China. 
 
Secondly, the focus of foreign banks has changed from competition to 
cooperation with local banks, aiming at making up for their disadvantages. 
 
The main competitors of foreign banks are the four largest state-owned 
Chinese banks—Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agriculture 
Bank of China, Bank of Construction and Bank of China. In the process of 
competing with Chinese banks, foreign banks face two main difficulties. 
The first one is the obstacles in the retail banking segment. The other one 
is that it is hard for them to find a stable source of capital in terms of 
Renminbi. The solution to both difficulties is a multi-dimensional retail 
network. Some empirical studies have also shown that foreign banks can’t 
beat the retail banking competition with Chinese banks, because they don’t 
have a well-connected relationship with local customers as the Chinese 
banks do.  
 
The experience of the development of the international banking 
system demonstrates the significance of retail banking for commercial 
banks. Foreign banks from Europe and America experienced the tough 
adjustment period in the last decade of the 20th century. They reduced their 
branches and provided services focusing on multi-dimensional financial 
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services and network-banking. They applied this new kind of financial 
structure to the Chinese market gradually. By now, they are scrambling for 
the Chinese financial market by means of cooperation, buying stocks from 
domestic banks and making joint ventures. These are wise decisions which 
can help them make up for their disadvantages.  
 
More and more foreign banks become joint stock partners of Chinese 
banks. On the one hand, they focus on long-term operational strategies. On 
the other hand, they also have short-term goal to take advantage of 
Chinese banks´ less-regulated financial environment and better-connected 
banking network to enter the retail banking segment. For example, the 
cooperation between HSBC and Shanghai Bank resulted in the birth of 
international Shanghai credit card on January, 2004. National City Bank of 
New York and Shanghai Pudong Develping Bank have also cooperated to 
issue the dollar & Renminbin credit card china wide.  
 
Thirdly, foreign banks fully use their advanced technologies and 
efficient management to strengthen their competitive advantages.  
 
Generally, in comparison with Chinese banks, foreign banks have 
obvious advantages in terms of financial technology, products and 
management. What they are short in is their knowledge of Chinese 
customers and the financial market. However, as early as foreign banks 
began to make profits in China, they had basically been used to the 
Chinese market. In the process of competing with Chinese banks in the 
future, foreign banks will analyze the demand of Chinese customers using 
their technological and managing advantages to continuously develop new 
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kinds of services to meet the demand. In fact, foreign banks have 
overtaken Chinese banks in terms of certain services and continue to 
expand their competitive advantages. 
 
On the one hand, personal wealth management has become one of 
the most important services of international banking. With the dramatically 
rapid development of the Chinese economy, there are more and more rich 
people in China. Therefore, the personal wealth management will be the 
most attractive banking service in the Chinese financial market. Some of 
the foreign banks have already provided such kinds of service in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Shenzhen. Because of the international well-know 
reputation, the experiences and the good access to foreign capital, foreign 
banks are always the first choice for Chinese when it comes to personal 
wealth management.  
 
On the other hand, foreign banks own a large capital base and most of 
the capital is well-performing capital. They have advanced international 
branches and customer networks. Therefore, they are good at foreign 
lending and foreign settlement. In these kinds of market segments, foreign 
banks are continuing to expand and are more successful than Chinese 
banks. An advanced hardware and software system, highly developed 
technology and international business scope are all the main factors of 
intermediary business. Foreign banks are obviously better at doing 
intermediary business. Furthermore, using flexible risk management 
measures, convenient service processes and lower lending limits, foreign 
banks are welcomed in many contractual joint ventures, cooperative 
ventures, solely foreign-funded enterprises and some Chinese 
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well-performing firms. By using the advantages, foreign banks can rapidly 
restructure the financial products and provide the customers with 
diversified and innovative products.  
 
Most of the foreign banks in China are big and famous worldwide.  
They have many successful experiences with capital management, 
investment banking and derivatives. On the one hand, the demand of 
Chinese customers for financial services is becoming more and more 
diversified. On the other hand, many foreign banks, for example, The 
National Bank of New York, are trying to form a monopoly in financial 
technology by applying patents to several financial products. Therefore, the 
Chinese banks face large stress competing with foreign banks. 
 
Fourthly, foreign banks apply diversified styles and strategies in China. 
    
Foreign banks apply different operational strategies depending on their 
different business styles. They fully use their advantages and focus on 
several financial services. In general, the multi-dimensional foreign banks 
use fully development strategy, wholesale banks continue to expand 
financial market and some others concentrate on special services. For 
example, The Bank of New York only does trade settlement business. It 
issues no single credit. Foreign banks from Europe and America are 
usually market-correlated. In contrast, most of the Asian foreign banks are 
banking-correlated. Many South Korean and Japanese Banks have 
established long-term cooperated relationships with some Chinese 
industries and companies to realize mutual benefits, therefore, they focus 
on wholesale banking. This is to say, the South Korean and Japanese 
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banks use the strategy of “follow their clients” in China. In contrary, the 
European and American banks get used to financing well-performing firms 
and providing multi-dimensional services. Their aim has been transferred 
from “follow the clients” to share the benefits in the highly developed 
Chinese economy. 
 
Fifthly, foreign banks keep using their corporate culture and 
operational characteristics to ensure their stable development in China. 
 
If we look back of foreign banks´ performance in recent years, we can 
find that foreign banks have served the Chinese customers better than the 
local banks. However, the flexibility of foreign banks´ performance depends 
on its corporate culture and operational characteristics which were 
gradually formed in its long-term operation in China. Foreign banks don’t 
seek innovation blindly but try to keep their established styles which have 
been firmly embedded in the mind of their employees. Because foreign 
banks maintain their corporate cultures and operational characteristics, 
they have formed the same sense of value in products and services. 
 
5.1.5 The impacts of foreign banks in China 
 
By analyzing the data from the four largest and ten other Chinese 
banks between 1996 and 2003, Huang and Xiong (2006) find that the local 
banks reacted very slowly to the growing number of branches and 
representative office of foreign banks. During these seven years, a number 
of foreign banks have expanded their business and formed a large network 
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in China. However, this fact has not been paid much attention by Chinese 
banks. Therefore, they have not adjusted their operational strategies a lot. 
On the other hand, the study shows that foreign banks´ entries did not 
affected the net interest income of Chinese banks significantly. On 
contrary, the non-interest income, the operating charges, and EBIT31 of the 
Chinese banks increased consistently with the entries of foreign banks 
(Guo and Zhang (2005) and Ru and Ding (2005)). 
 
Foreign banks have several impacts on the Chinese financial system. 
 
Firstly, the growth of the quantity of foreign banks has affected the 
Chinese financial system significantly. 
 
Some studies find that the increasing entries of foreign banks can 
influence the efficiency of local banks in host countries (Claessens, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001). In some developing countries, the 
impact of a larger number of foreign banks´ entries in the Chinese banking 
system has even overwhelmed that of their increasing market shares.  
 
Generally, it takes foreign banks time from entering a new host country 
to establishing branches. At the first stage, foreign banks try to enlarge their 
distribution, but their market shares are still small.  At this time, some 
sensitive Chinese banks are aware of this change and apply some 
countermeasures accordingly. In contrast, there are lots of local banks that 
respond too slowly to the change and as a result, they will lose their market 
shares. Therefore, the lack of response by Chinese banks to the increasing 
 
31 EBIT is the abbreviation of the earning before interest and tax. 
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participation of foreign banks just reflects their slow reaction to the changes 
of the market.  
 
The main reason for Chinese banks´ slow reaction is the inflexible 
operational system of the Chinese financial market. In the management 
segment of Chinese banks, there is a lack of strategic and crisis senses. 
Furthermore, the Chinese financial market is marvelously big, but there are 
only a few Chinese banks. It is relatively difficult for them to find significant 
changes and respond to them at once. 
 
Secondly, the net interest income is not affected by the growing 
participation of foreign banks.  
 
It is due to the interest rate in China being loosely market-correlated. 
Although Chinese banks are flexible in setting prices of loans, the Chinese 
banking sector is inelastic. There are drastic competitions in pricing and 
strong externalities of interest revenue. Though the Chinese interest rate is 
becoming more and more market-correlated, the authority of pricing has 
only begun unregulated in recent years. The setting of the interest rate for 
deposit and loans of commercial banks was always controlled by the 
Chinese central bank. Local banks´ lending behavior is largely regulated by 
the Chinese government. It results in the fact that Chinese commercial 
banks have almost no right to control and adjust interest margins.  
 
Thirdly, the non-interest income is positively affected by foreign bank’s 
entries. By analyzing foreign banks´ performance in Eastern Europe, 
Uiboupin (2005) shows that the growing entries of foreign banks result in 
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the decrease of the non-interest income of local banks. The difference in 
the relationship between non-interest income and foreign banks´ entries in 
Asia and Eastern Europe is due to the low degree of integration among 
Chinese financial segments. 
 
According to the classical theory, in developing countries, if some local 
banks fail to compete in some segments, they intend to transfer their losses 
to their customers by increasing the price of products in other segments 
where they have competitive advantages. It applies perfectly to the 
Chinese financial market. With the development of the Chinese capital and 
currency market, the traditional savings and lending services don’t appeal 
to the customers as much as before. Therefore, in the process of 
competing both with other local banks and with foreign banks, most of the 
Chinese banks make efforts to enhance other services to gain more 
non-interest income.  
 
Under the circumstances of separated supervision on the Chinese 
financial market, foreign banks are still not allowed to enter the market 
segment that the non-interest income depends on. Moreover, due to the 
lack of a well-connected network with Chinese customers, it is still difficult 
for foreign banks to penetrate the retail banking segment.  
 
Recently, the Chinese banks concentrated on expanding their 
intermediary services and some of them have even gained the underwriting 
right of short-term financing bonds. In the meantime, they have improved 
their technologies of retail banking by providing various kinds of services of 
built-up personal wealth management with the help of some financial 
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holding companies. The most attractive change in the Chinese banks` 
services is that they charge fees for some services which were originally 
free. For example, they charge annual fees for bank cards and managing 
fees for small-amount deposit accounts. 
 
Fourthly, the growing participation of foreign banks leads to higher 
operating charges for Chinese banks. Together with the more and more 
competitors in the banking system, the local banks have largely introduced 
high-tech and new installations to change their original operating structure 
and organizations, in order to make up for their shortcomings compared to 
foreign banks. Furthermore, the Chinese banks have invested heavily in 
the training of employees. All of these factors mentioned above require 
higher operating charges. This effect of foreign banks´ entries has also 
been found in Eastern Europe (Uiboupin, 2005). 
 
Lastly, because the non-interest income is significantly positively 
correlated with foreign banks´ entries and this increase overwhelms the 
increase of operating charges of Chinese banks. Therefore, the income 
before tax is also significantly positively correlated with foreign banks´ 
entry. 
 
       To summarize, foreign banks are trying to fully develop their 
competitive advantages to make great profits in the big Chinese financial 
market. In contrast, the Chinese banks are still strictly regulated by the 
Chinese financial and economic system. During the competition with 
foreign banks, they can not adjust the strategies in time. Therefore, foreign 
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5.2
                                                
banks´ entries have some different impacts on the Chinese banking sector 
than in other developing countries.  
 
 The entries of foreign banks into Poland 
  
In comparison to China, Poland’s situation of foreign banks` entries is 
influenced by the privatization process of Polish banks. 
 
Before 1989, the banking system in Poland was highly controlled by 
the Polish government in a planned economy. The interest rate and banks´ 
lending behavior were decided by the government. By the end of 1988, 
there were three state-owned banks, two shareholding commercial 
banks32, one cooperative bank and 1663 small local cooperative banks. 
Under the centralized control of the Polish government, although there 
were several professional banks, the National Bank of Poland contained 
the features of both commercial banks and of central banks and played a 
multi-dimensional role in the banking system. In 1989, the planned 
economy in Poland turned to market economy, and there was a reform in 
the banking system. The process of economic transition and the reform of 
banking system lasted from 1989-1992.  
 
 
 
 
 
32 They were 100% state-owned banks.  
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5.2.1 The three reform periods of the banking sector in Poland 
 
Similar to other Eastern Europe countries, the reform of the Polish 
banking system can be divided into two periods. In the first period, the 
centralized banking system was transformed into two segments: central 
bank and commercial banks. The commercial banks are based on the 
market. In the second period, Poland has performed a privatization reform 
of banks and decided to abolish the regulations towards foreign banks 
gradually. In general, the entries of foreign banks and the privatization of 
Polish banks were the most important contents of the reform in the Polish 
banking sector. 
 
There are three periods of the reform. 
         
The first one was from 1989 to 1992. The New Banking Law, which 
was issued in 1989, only regulated the basic guidelines in the chapter of 
“the establishment of new banks”. Therefore, it opened “a wide way” to 
foreign banks which tended to invest in Poland. Between 1989 and 1992, 
there were in all 70 banks established in Poland and foreign banks were 
regarded as weaker competitors by the local banks. Between 1990 and 
1992, the Polish government published several preferential policies in 
terms of tax and foreign currency holding in order to provide foreign banks 
with a better investment environment. At that time, however, most of the 
foreign investors were not willing to invest in Poland because of its risky 
financial environment. There were only a few foreign banks in Poland: The 
National City Bank of New York, Creditanstalt Bankverein of Austria and 
The Commercial Bank of Netherlands. The intention of their entries was to 
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“follow the clients” and the business scope was only limited to the basic 
transactions related to international trade, for example, international 
settlement etc. They invested just because of the requirement of 
international trade and took almost no consideration of strategic 
investment. In this period, seven foreign banks entered Poland.  
 
The second period is from 1993 to 1997. As mentioned above, in the 
first period, the New Banking Laws were without effective regulations in 
terms of establishing new financial institutions. As a result, most of the 
new-established financial institutions were incapable. They had a low 
capital level and weak operating strategies. If these regulations were 
implemented unchangeably, the whole banking system would also become 
unstable. Therefore, at the end of 1992, the chapter of “the establishment 
of new banks” was abolished. Meanwhile, to avoid foreign banks´ 
expanding their business scope in the fields where they had competitive 
advantages, for example, consumer loans, leasing and mortgage loans and 
to protect the local banks with weak competitive advantages, the Polish 
government only allowed foreign banks´ entries conditionally. Foreign 
banks were allowed to enter, only if they promised to finance the incapable 
local banks. 
 
In order to improve the efficiency of Poland’s banking system and to 
help local banks set up a modern managing system, the local banks in 
Poland began the process of privatization in 1993. The main characteristic 
of the privatization process was the further strengthening of the openness 
of Polish banks to foreign banks. They sold a small part of shares of 
stated-owned banks to several foreign investors on the stock market, and 
the government still kept its control over Polish banks through holding the 
majority of shares. We can see from Figure 8 below, that from 1993 to 
2000, there were nine Polish banks that separated from the state-owned 
banks group and five among these had performed the privatization by 
selling their stock shares.  
 
Figure 833:  
The Process of Privatization of Nine Polish Commercial Banks 
(1993-2000) 
Name of Banks Years Way of Privatization Capital Shares 
Wielkopolski Bank 
Kredytowy SA 
1993 Issuing stocks EBRD (28.5%), 
State (30%), other 
small 
shareholders 
(34.75%) 
Bank Slaski SA 1994 Issuing stocks The Commecial 
Bank of  
Netherlands 
(25.9%), State 
(33.2%) 
Bank Gdanski  w. 
Gdansku  SA 
1995 Issuing stocks Big SA (24.07%) 
Bank 
Prezernyslowo-Handlowy 
SA 
1995 Issuing stocks State (46.61%), 
other small 
shareholders 
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In this period of privatization, although the foreign investors could only 
gain a small part of shares which must be less than 30%, through taking 
part in the management of local banking sector, they were able to learn 
about the market environment of the host country, wait for new chances of 
further development and prepare for expansion in the future. Between 1993 
and 1994, EBRD34 and The Commercial Bank of Netherlands had one after 
another become the shareholders of Polish state-owned 
 
33 Dong, W. 2006, “The Privatization and Introducing Foreign Banks in Reform: Poland’s Experience”, 
The Banker, 06. 
34 EBRD is the abbreviation of European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
(53.39%) 
Powszechny Bank 
Kredytowy SA 
1997 Issuing stocks State(33.3%), 
other small 
shareholders 
(66.7%) 
Bank Zachodni SA 1999 Selling FB most stock 
shares 
AIB European 
Investment 
Limited (80%), 
State (4.29%), 
others (15.71%) 
Powszechny Bank 
Gospodarezy SA 
1999 The merger with Bank 
Polska Kasa Opieki 
 
Bank 
Depozytowo-Kredytowy 
SA 
1999 The merger with Bank 
Polska Kasa Opieki 
 
Pomorski  Bank 
Kredytowy SA 
1999 The merger with Bank 
Polska Kasa Opieki 
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banks—Wielkopolski Bank Kredytowy SA and Banks Slaski SA. In both 
case, the shares of investment were less than 30% (28.5% and 25.9% 
separately). However, the reconstruction of the three other state-owned 
banks went not very successfully in terms of attracting foreign investors. In 
a word, due to the passive participation of foreign banks from 1993 to 1997, 
the process of privatization of Polish banks didn’t depend a lot on foreign 
banks. 
 
The third period of the reform in the Polish banking segment was from 
1998 to 2000. This period was also the second part of the privatization 
process. To perform the duties as a member country of OECD35 and to 
prepare for the entry into the EU in May, 2004, the Polish government 
gradually abolished the regulations towards foreign banks´ entries. The 
government chose the well-performing foreign banks and sold them a large 
part of stock shares of state-owned banks. 
 
This change of  Poland’s policy was fully reflected by the Acquisition 
Act of foreign banks in 1998.  In this year, the government sold more than 
30% of the stock shares of Bank Prezemyslowo-Handlowy SA and The 
Powszechny Bank Kredytowy SA to HVB36 and Creditanstalt Bankverein of 
Austria. It was the first time that the foreign strategic investors were able to 
control the Polish financial institutions. In 1999, the state-owned bank Bank 
Zachodni SA was controlled by AIB Investment Limited of Ireland holding 
80% of the stock shares. Although the assets and capital shares held by 
foreign banks did not change fundamentally in 1998, the new policy 
performed by Polish government made foreign banks gain more market 
 
35 OECD is the abbreviation of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
36 HVB is the abbreviation of Bayerishe Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG. 
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shares. By the end of 1999, the assets and capital shares of foreign banks 
were respectively up to 47.2% and 50.2%. 
 
Another attractive phenomenon in 1998 was that most of the Polish 
banks merged with foreign banks. Since 1998, besides a few local banks 
leaving the banking segment due to bankruptcy, the number of local banks 
had been decreased dramatically, because too many mergers and 
acquisitions were led by foreign bank. The Polish banks, however, 
welcomed the merger and acquisitions, because they wanted to strengthen 
their market position. For example, in 1999, Bank Polska Kasa Opieki SA 
merged with Powszechny Bank Gospodarczy and other two banks which 
separated from the Polish state-owned banks group in 1989. 
 
In 2000, the process of the Polish banking system’s privatization was 
finished, but the merger and acquisition between the foreign and Polish 
banks had not been ended. Especially after 2000, foreign banks had 
merged with local banks actively. For instance, Bank Austria Creditanstalt 
SA merged with Powszechny Bank Kredytowy SA and Bank Handlowy w. 
Warszawie SA merged with Citibank (Poland) SA. 
 
After the privatization of the Polish banking sector, foreign banks´ 
market shares in Poland were very stable. The number of banks in 
Poland’s banking system declined gradually. But the high degree of 
concentration contributed to the development of the banking sector. Many 
financial indicators, for example, ROA, ROE, earning and cost ratio, 
interest margin etc, were improved continuously. The banking sector in 
Poland developed stably and soundly. 
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5.2.2 The successful experience of Poland’s banking sector reform 
 
Poland has succeeded in the privatization process of the banking 
sector.  Which experience can be learned by other developing countries? 
 
On the one hand, the regulations of the local government affect the 
entry decision and operational strategies of foreign banks. The regulations 
can also determine the role of foreign banks in the host countries. A proper 
policy can help improve the competition in the banking sector and push the 
local banks to facilitate their efficiency and strengthen the management. On 
the contrary, the conservative and radical policies can not only mislead the 
local banks but also make them lose their dominant position in the banking 
sector. Poland’s sound and stable banking system is largely due to the 
Polish government’s wise policy in the 1990s. 
 
On the other hand, the supervisors of the banking system must watch 
the process of foreign banks´ entries seriously. For example, in 1998, the 
stress from the negotiation with EU and the promise to perform OECD 
agreements made the Polish government change its attitude towards the 
participation of foreign banks. It encouraged the well-performing foreign 
banks to enter Poland. The Polish government kept a proper pace of 
introducing foreign banks´ entries. It regarded the entries of foreign 
investors as an effective way to stabilize and strengthen Poland’s banking 
sector. In order to ensure the quality of foreign banks in terms of capital 
adequacy and advanced technology, the supervisory department in Poland 
selected foreign banks carefully. Meanwhile, to avoid the banking sector 
being  controlled by a few foreign countries, the Polish government paid 
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high attention to the degree of decentralization of foreign banks´ home 
countries. For example, if a Foreign Bank was from a country which 
invested in Poland for the first time, the Polish government was willing to 
make an exception to accept its investment application. Furthermore, if the 
foreign bank innovated a new kind of service, for example, automotive 
financial services, the supervisory department would also encourage it and 
provide preferential conditions. 
 
Finally, in the process of the banking sector’s privatization, it is very 
important for the transitional countries to introduce strategic foreign 
investors. Although only introducing foreign banks is not enough for the 
reconstruction of the banking system, the participation of foreign banks can 
optimize the ownership structure of commercial banks, improve the level of 
risk management of local banks and strengthen the innovation of the 
banking services.  
       
  5.2.3 The impacts of foreign banks in Poland 
                  
       Foreign banks have positively affected the Polish economy. 
   
       Firstly, by taking part in the privatization process, foreign banks have 
stimulated the transition of the Polish economy. Between 1990 and 1998, 
there were 244 state-owned enterprises realizing the privatization. 87 firms 
of them were 100% foreign-owned. 16 firms were joint ventures and 
through the auction of their stock shares, they participated in the 
privatization of thousands of small firms. By the end of 1999, the amount of 
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the foreign investment was about 120 billion U.S. dollars, accounting for 
49.7% of the overall capital of the Polish commercial banks. The proportion 
of the private banks rose from 23.4% in 1998 to 25.4% in 1999. The 
deposits received by foreign banks accounted for 45.7% of the 
non-financial deposits. In the meantime, they made loans which were 
50.9% of the overall amount of net loans in the Polish banking sector. (Wu, 
2002) 
 
       Secondly, foreign banks have improved the employment and the 
qualification of the employees in the banking sector. In 1998, there were 
about 840 thousand employees working in foreign banks, accounting for 
15.6% of the overall amount of employees in Poland (Wu, 2002). Foreign 
banks brought advanced technologies, modern marketing concepts and 
successful organizational and managerial experiences. They strengthened 
the management and organization of the human resource, and improved 
the professional skills of the employees. After holding or controlling the 
stock shares of the state-owned banks, in order to improve the qualification 
of the employees, foreign banks restructured the recruitment process and 
the training mechanism, and provided the aspirants with further education 
chances. As a result, the efficiency and the managerial level of the Polish 
banking sector were significantly improved. 
 
       Thirdly, foreign banks have improved the innovation of financial 
services. They had advantages of providing high-quality services, 
diversified products and up-to-date financial information. Most of the 
foreign banks owned good reputations in Poland, and they brought 
innovative financial instruments, high-tech services and advanced 
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operating styles into Poland. According to Yi and Guo (2002), The Bank of 
East Asia from Japan provided the installment payment service of housing 
for the first time. It improved the reform and development of housing in 
Poland. In the meantime, in order to spread risk, foreign banks made also 
bank consortium loans. The new services and managerial skills helped 
enhance the efficiency and reduce the risk in the local banking sector.  
 
       On the other hand, foreign banks have also brought some problems. 
    
       Firstly, foreign banks brought only limited technologies and they lend 
mainly to the Polish traditional enterprises instead of the high-tech 
industries. The reason was that the high-tech industries in Poland were 
riskier and on a small scale. For example, in 1999, 7.5% of the foreign 
investment flowed into high-tech industries and only 1.2% was into the 
machinery department which played an important role in high-tech 
industries. This phenomenon was not consistent with the macroeconomic 
strategy of improving Polish industries` technological level through 
attracting foreign investment.  
 
       Secondly, most of the foreign banks used the “Cherry Picking” 
strategy. They compete with local banks for serving the high-end 
customers. Foreign banks had many competitive strengths comparing with 
local banks in Poland. They had a fully developed management system, a 
flexible operating mechanism, advanced and standard services, and strict 
financial supervision. In the field of international capital business, 
derivatives services and intermediary services, foreign banks had 
advantages. In the meantime, they enjoyed many preferable treatments. 
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6.
Therefore, many local customers preferred to deal with foreign banks. 
According to Wu (2002), 80% of the profits in the Polish banking sector 
were from high-end customers, and most of the high-income individuals 
and high-end customers turned from local to foreign banks.  
 
       Thirdly, a large number of highly trained employees in local banks 
went to foreign banks. In order to expand their market shares, foreign 
banks allured the excellent employees with some attractive benefits, for 
example, high salaries, many extra profits, high position and training 
chances in foreign countries. As a result, the local banks lost the 
experienced and skilled employees and the gap between the foreign and 
local banks became larger. The outflow of the employees could also lead to 
the loss of some good customers.  
 
       In summary, foreign banks bring some challenges to the Polish 
banking sectors, such as their limited services, the intense competition and 
the outflow of the employees, but continuing to attract foreign banks´ 
entries is still a very significant strategy followed by the Polish government. 
Foreign banks can help  improve the banking efficiency, spread the 
financial risk and  enhance the capital allocation.  
 
 Conclusion 
      
This paper has analyzed the entries of foreign banks in developing 
countries. Firstly, I have generally examined the factors affecting foreign 
banks´ decision on entries, their activities, their entry patterns and 
organizational forms, and the impacts on the local banking sector. Then I 
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try to have a close look at foreign banks´ participation in both China and 
Poland. 
 
Foreign banks consider many factors when they expand to 
developing countries, such as the economic relationship between a foreign 
bank’s home and host countries, the profitable opportunities, the local 
regulations and the similarities between the home and the host country. 
Firstly, the more economically integrated the home and host countries are, 
the more the foreign banks invest in the host country. Secondly, foreign 
banks are attracted by the great profitable opportunities. High GDP, high 
economic growth and low banking efficiency are all indicators of the 
potential profitability. Thirdly, the regulations used in the host countries also 
affect the entry decision. A strictly regulated banking sector is less 
attractive for foreign banks. Fourthly, the geographic proximity, economic 
similarities, similar culture and habits, and same language are also 
important factors taken into account by them. They intend to use their 
competitive advantages formed in their early business in a similar 
environment. 
 
Once foreign banks enter developing countries, they need to compete 
with the local banks intensely. Although they perform more efficiently, the 
local banks are better connected with the local customers and the 
government. Foreign banks tend to lend more to big firms rather than the 
small ones, because the small firms are usually with asymmetric 
information and a weak legal system.  
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There are four main kinds of entry patterns of foreign banks in 
developing countries: solely foreign-invested banks, joint venture, 
acquisitions and mergers. Joint venture, acquisitions and mergers are the 
most common patterns for the reason of the existence of a less developed 
banking sector. If many local banks are bought by or merged with foreign 
banks, there will be less provision of credit for small firms, but this fact can 
be offset by the increase on credit provision by other local banks that 
haven’t merged with foreign banks.  
 
There are four types of organizational forms used by foreign banks 
entering developing countries: representative offices, agencies, branches 
and subsidiaries. The latter two forms are preferred, because they can offer 
the same services as their parent banks do. However, branches are too 
much regulated. They suffer the regulations both from host and home 
countries.  
 
Foreign banks´ entries in developing countries bring benefits to local 
banks. It improves the efficiency and stability, helps speed up the 
privatization of the local banks, and enhances the local access to foreign 
credit. Of course, in the short term, they bring also some unstable factors 
into host countries, such as transmitting shocks from home to host 
countries, following the inconsistent developing strategies, competing with 
local banks for high-end customers and making the local financial system 
excessive liberalized.  
 
In China, the banking sector is highly regulated by the government. 
Therefore, the Chinese banks can’t react to foreign banks´ performance in 
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time. However, the big financial market and the high growth rate attract 
more and more foreign banks into China.  
 
In Poland, foreign banks´ entries are together with the privatization of 
Polish Banks. The Polish government have facilitated the banking 
efficiency and improved the managerial technologies. More and more 
strategic foreign investors enter Poland. In the meantime, foreign banks´ 
business is highly supervised. All these factors make the privatization 
process successful. Although foreign banks provide limited services, 
compete for high-end customers and lead to the outflow of highly trained 
employees, they have stimulates the privatization process and improve the 
banking efficiency in Poland.  
 
Regarding the developing trend of financial integration, there will be 
more and more foreign banks entering developing countries. Therefore, 
further theoretical and empirical analyses of foreign banks´ motivations, 
modes and impacts are absolute necessary.  
 
The most important topic given international attention is that what 
impacts the foreign banks have on the host countries after entering. 
Because no matter what factors make them enter and no matter what 
organizational forms they take, the aim of foreign banks is to make profits. 
It depends on a banks´ objective function of the profit maximation. 
However, no general theories can tell us what the situation of the 
economical development, the financial stability, the development of local 
banking sectors and the local access to credit will become, after foreign 
banks´ entries. One implication may be that there exist no general rules 
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available to explain the impacts of foreign banks. Both the positive and the 
negative effects are determined by the degree of the economical 
development, the market conditions and the degree of financial supervision 
in host countries. 
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A) Abstract 
 
This paper analyzed the entries of foreign banks in developing 
countries. There are many factors that affect the entry decision of foreign 
banks, for example, the economic relationship between the home and host 
country, the profitable opportunities and the regulations in the host 
countries, and the similar features between the home and host countries. 
After entering, most of the foreign banks choose branch or subsidiary as 
the organizational forms. Foreign banks bring the local financial system 
both positive and negative impacts. In short term, they may make the local 
banking sector unstable, but if there are sound economical policies and 
effective financial supervision in the host countries, in long term, foreign 
banks´ entries can help improve the efficiency and competition in the local 
financial system, strengthen the stability of the banking sector and facilitate 
the provision of credits to the local customers. In both China and Poland, 
foreign banks have improved the efficiency and strengthened the 
competition in the local banking sector.  
 
Keywords: foreign banks´ entries, the host country, domestic banks, 
impacts.  
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B) German Abstract 
 
Diese Arbeit analysiert die Expansion ausländischer Banken in 
Entwicklungsländer. Es gibt viele Gründe für die Entscheidung ausländischer 
Banken, in Entwicklungsländern zu investieren, wie zum Beispiel die 
wirtschaftliche Beziehung zwischen Heimat- und Gastland, die profitablen 
Möglichkeiten und Bestimmungen in den Gastländern und die ähnlichen 
Eigenschaften der Gast- und Heimatländer. Nach der Expansion entscheiden 
sich viele der ausländischen Banken für die Organisationsform einer Filiale 
oder Tochtergesellschaft. Auf das lokale Finanzsystem haben ausländische 
Banken sowohl positive als auch negative Auswirkungen. Kurzfristig können 
sie den lokalen Banksektor destabilisieren, wenn aber die Gastländer über 
eine intakte Wirtschaftspolitik und eine effektive Finanzüberwachung verfügen, 
kann die Expansion ausländischer Banken langfristig dazu beitragen, die 
Effizienz und den Wettbewerb des lokalen Finanzsystems zu steigern, die 
Stabilität des Banksektors zu stärken und die Bereitstellung von Krediten für 
die lokalen Konsumenten zu vereinfachen. Sowohl in China als auch in Polen 
haben ausländische Banken die Effizienz gesteigert und den Wettbewerb im 
lokalen Banksektor gestärkt. 
 
Schlüsselwörter: Expansion ausländischer Banken, Gastland, heimische 
Banken, Auswirkungen. 
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